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Abstract
In this paper we evaluate an indivisible investment project that is carried out in a corporation under
very simple premises. In particular, we discuss a one-period model with certainty, the pure domestic
case and proportional tax rates. Surprisingly, the decision problem turns out to be rather complex if
one has to make allowance for different taxation of the corporation and its owner. Altogether there are
more than 10 cases that have to be distinguished if the firm’s managers want tomake a correct decision,
depending on the relation of personal and corporate tax rates.
Keywords: Investment Decisions, Financing Policy, Payout Policy, Dividend Distribution Decisions,
Tax Planning
1 Problem
For a long time business studies have dealt with
the evaluation of taxable investments under the
assumption of certainty. The same is true for op-
timal financing regarding taxation. However, the
taxation consequences of different ways to finance
an investment are rarely considered when valuing
investments.1 This is especially important if the
investment is carried out by a corporation sub-
ject to tax. The taxation of corporations as well
as their shareholders may cause distortions. In
the literature, the tax effects on investment de-
cisions,2 on capital structure decisions,3 and on
dividend distributions4 are discussed separately.
There is no closed model with simultaneous after-
tax optimization of the default alternative for the
* Thanks are due to Rainer Niemann, the department editor
of this issue, and two anonymous referees for suggestions for
the improvement of this paper. Special thanks go to Dominica
Canefield, Sven Husmann, Olaf Siegmund, Christian Sielaff,
and Caren Sureth for their helpful comments and remarks on
earlier versions. Remaining deficiencies are the authors’ alone.
1 See Husmann and Kruschwitz (2001), Husmann and
Kruschwitz (2002), Kiesewetter and Dietrich (2007), Hus-
mann (2007).
2 E.g.,Hassett and Hubbard (2002).
3 E.g., Kaplow (2006), pp. 28--33; Graham (2006), pp. 576--
583.
4 E.g., Auerbach (2002).
shareholder relief system.5 We are going to close
this gap with this study.
It will be examined whether it is worth carrying
out investment projects. This will be analyzed in
a model with only two payment date points (t = 0
and t = 1). Regarding certainty it is assumed that
the investor owns a corporation subject to tax
and that a shareholder relief system is applied.6
It is evaluated whether the investment is to be
preferred over its default alternative, measured by
the financial resources which are available at the
end of the planning period (terminal value). It is
assumed that the investor is unsatiated.
A model with only one investment and one return
cash flow date in which all data are assumed as
certain is not suitable for practical decisions. The
function of the model is rather to evaluate tax ef-
fects on the investor’s objective (here, the terminal
value) in an extremely simplified and stylized de-
cision situation. In particular, it will be shown how
the additional terminal value contribution of the
investment project reacts to changes in the firm’s
tax rate.
5 This is made obvious by e.gHaase and Diller (2002).
6 Similar to Husmann and Kruschwitz (2001), Husmann and
Kruschwitz (2002).
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2 Model
2.1 Assumptions
The assumptions that affect the financing of the
investment project are critical for our model. At
the date t = 0 the firm -- a corporation subject to
corporate taxation -- possesses cash in the amount
of C0 which is covered by revenue reserves that
have already been taxed. In addition, the owner of
the firm has personal cash resources in the amount
of P0. It is assumed that the owner has already sat-
isfied his or her own current consumption needs.
In order to realize the indivisible investment, the
firm must raise the amount of I0. If the existing
resources C0 are insufficient or it is advantageous
to allocate these resources to another use, the firm
can acquire funds from two financing resources:
Either the owner transfers personal resources to
the firm (external financing with equity), or the
firm takes out a loan (external financing with credit
capital).7 At the date t = 1, a complete refund and
repayment of the corresponding amounts is made
to the financiers. If the firm decides against the
investment project, the project does not require
the whole amount of available capital, or it is fi-
nanced externally. The firm can either distribute
the remaining resources to the owner (i.e., declare
a dividend) or reinvest them in the capital market.
We exclude both capital reductions that exceed the
increase in capital at the date t = 0 and share re-
purchases. If the firm takes out a loan, the creditor
can demand an interest rate based on the market
interest rate i. The same interest rate applies if the
firm or owner makes an investment. We exclude
personal debts.
The firm pays corporate income tax. Paid interest
may be fully or partially deductible. Personal in-
terest income is completely subject to income tax.
Dividends are taxed according to the shareholder
relief system.
Each evaluation of an investment project is relative
because it is always based on a comparison with
a default alternative. If a complete capital mar-
ket is assumed and taxes are not considered, it is
sufficient to characterize the default alternative as
7 The consideration of credit financing by the owner is not
necessary in our model for the following reason. If there is
a single market rate of interest and if it is assumed that the
external creditor borrows the amount from the owner, external
financing with credit is as good as credit financing by the owner.
SeeGratz (2002), p. 491, where it is also considered that private
yields on interest are not completely taxed.
a financial investment and/or a credit with the in-
terest rate i. If profit taxes are considered, a higher
degree of precision is necessary because the ter-
minal value for the owner will vary according to
whether a capital investment is made by the firm
or the owner himself. In order to avoid the invest-
ment project being compared with a suboptimal
alternative, the default alternative itself must also
be optimized regarding taxes.
2.2 Relevant payments and budget
restrictions
Table 1 shows a complete overview of all payments
that are incurred by the firm and the owner. In
order to avoid overlap work, we will include the
investment project. If this project is not carried
out, the corresponding payments I0 and CF1 are
nullified. The symbols in Table 1 are mostly self-
explanatory: Cash inflows have a positive algebraic
sign; cash outflows have a negative algebraic sign.
The dividend distribution at the date t = 1 is the
cash flow of the investment project CF1 plus the
inflow from the financial investmentMc
0
(1 + i) mi-
nus the cash outflow to the creditorD0(1+ i) minus
the equity repayment to the owner E0 minus the
tax payment of the firm Tc
1
:
(1) Div1 = CF1 +Mc0(1 + i) − E0 −D0(1 + i) − T
c
1 .
Table 1: Overview of all payments
including the investment project
Corporate level t = 0 t = 1
Available cash resources C0 −






+D0 −D0(1 + i)








Personal level t = 0 t = 1
Available cash resources P0 −











Sum 0 = V1
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Using (1), the terminal value for the owner is
described by the following equation:
V1 = E0 +M
p
0
(1 + i) − Tp
1
+Div1(2)








Table 1 contains a budget restriction at the date
t = 0 for the firm:
(3) I0 +M
c
0 +Div0 = C0 +D0 + E0 − T
c
0 .












are not supposed to be-
come negative. Capital reduction and loan repay-
ments at t = 0 are hereby excluded.
2.3 Corporate taxes and personal taxes
In general we assume that all tax rates are propor-
tional and constant over time. As a corporation,
the firm pays profit taxes on its profits with the
rate τc. If more than one profit tax is levied, τc is
a tax multifactor that contains every profit tax.
Many countries do not allow a full charge of debit
interest in calculating the tax base of every profit
tax. So we define a second tax multifactor τi to
model the additional tax on debit interest. We call
this rate ‘‘the debit interest surcharge rate’’.
Fiscal law may allow for part of the investment pay-
ment to be already charged at date t = 0 as costs,
for instance purchase or production costs of the
investment payment, or partial ‘‘immediate amor-
tization’’. Since on the date t = 0 no sales have yet
been realized, the firm will report a taxable loss. If
the immediately deductible part of the investment
payment is called β, the following corporate tax
equation results:
(5) Tc
0 = −τcβI0 .
Therefore, the firm receives a tax refund if we
assume that an immediate and complete loss ad-
justment is possible.
We assume that the profit contribution of the in-
vestment project in t = 1 amounts to CF1 − (1−β)I0
(clean surplus concept) and that the profits are
completely domestic. To calculate the corporate
tax base, the interest income of the financial in-
vestment must be added and the paid interest for
the credit must be charged. The tax base of the debit
interest surcharge is iD0. Now the tax equation of
the firm for t = 1 is applied as follows:
(6) Tc1 = τc(CF1 − (1− β)I0 + i(M
c
0 −D0)) + τiiD0 .





(shareholder relief system) where τp represents
the income tax rate and δ ∈ (0, 1] represents the
taxable part of the dividend. In t = 1 the owner
receives a dividend from the firm which is also
taxable under the shareholder relief system. Addi-
tionally, the owner gains personal interest that is
taxed in full. The income tax at t = 1 is
(8) Tp
1




A definitive flat rate withholding tax on interest
and dividends can be easily integrated by the right
choice of τp and δ.8
2.4 General description of the terminal
value
In order to analyze the terminal value for the owner
in detail, we start with equation (2). Solving equa-





results in the following:









Including the tax equations (5), (6), (7) and (8),
using equation (1) and repeated use of equations
(3) and (4) results in
V1 = (−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1)(1 − τc)(1 − δτp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contribution of the investment project
(9)
+ P0(1 + i(1 − τp)) + C0(1 + i(1 − τc))(1 − δτp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contribution of the transfer-free financial investment
+Div0i(τc − τp)(1 − δτp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dividend contribution
− E0i(τc − τc* )(1 − δτp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contribution of external equity financing
− αD0iτi(1 − δτp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Credit contribution
.
8 The effect of a flat rate withholding tax on investment and
financing decisions is discussed in detail by Kiesewetter and
Lachmund (2004).
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Disregarding local business tax and interest effects,
τc* can be interpreted as the corporate income tax
rate for which distributed profits in the shareholder
relief system are subject to the same tax burden
as earnings of the owner subject to income tax.9
Equation (9) is central to all further considerations.
It shows that the terminal value of the owner
consists of five sources:
1. Contribution of the investment project to the
terminal value: If the project is not carried out
(I0 = 0 and CF1 = 0), this component will
disappear.
2. Contribution to the terminal value in cases
of financial investments free from transfers:
The second component describes which con-
tribution results from a complete financial in-
vestment of all available personal and corpo-
rate financial resources for the terminal value.
We call this ‘‘financial investments free from
transfers’’ because in this case the firm invests
amount C0 and the owner invests amount P0
at the interest rate i. In t = 0, any transfer of
financial resources between the firm and the
owner that might be necessary for financing
the project or for tax planning is not part of
this component.
3. Dividend contribution: The third component
describes how the transfer (distribution) of
financial resources in t = 0 from the firm to the
owner contributes to the terminal value. This
contribution is obviously positive if τc > τp,
which means that the profit tax rate of the firm
is higher than the income tax rate of the owner.
4. Contribution of external equity financing: The
contribution of a capital increase describes the
influence of a transfer of the owner’s personal
available financial resources to the firm (tem-
porary increase in capital). The contribution of
a capital increase is positive if τc < τc* .
5. Credit contribution: The admittance of a credit
by the firm and its effects on the terminal value
9 For example, when τp = 0.4 and δ = 0.5, τc* results in 0.25.
of the owner are included by the credit contri-
bution. This component has a negative influ-
ence on the terminal value providing a positive
tax rate τi below 100 %. Nevertheless, it can-
not be concluded that external financing must
in each case be avoided. It is possible that
the net benefits from a (complete or partial)
credit-financed investment project exceed the
net benefits from the no-credit case.
For the following it will be useful to prove that






As the denominator is positive, we receive
(1 − δ)τp ≥ 0 ,
which is obviously correct. In order to show that





Since τp andδ are positive, we are able to determine
that
1 − δ < 1 − δτp
δ > δτp
1 > τp
remains. This is what we had presumed.
3 Tax-optimized default
alternative
We focus on the default alternative so that I0 = 0
and CF1 = 0. Div0, E0 and D0 remain as decision
variables. If we use the symbol V 1 which stands
for the terminal value reached with the help of the
default alternative, we receive the terminal value
equation (9) with the corresponding reduction
V 1 = P0(1 + i(1 − τp))
+ C0(1 + i(1 − τc))(1 − δτp)
+Div0i(τc − τp)(1 − δτp)
− E0i(τc − τc* )(1 − δτp)
−D0iτi(1 − δτp) .
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In the first step we will show under what set of tax
rates a dividend (Div0), an increase in capital (E0)
or a credit (D0) is beneficial. In the second step we
deduce for each tax rate combination a ranking of
the above-mentioned alternatives. Due toδ ∈ (0, 1]
as well as τp ∈ (0, 1), the following conclusions can
be drawn:
1. If permanent debt interest is not completely
deductible (τi > 0), the contribution of credit
financing to the terminal value of the owner
is always negative.10 Credit capital should not
be acquired. Otherwise, (τi = 0) it makes no
difference whether or not a loan is taken.
2. If τc > τp, each dividend payment increases the
terminal value of the owner in t = 0. The bud-
get restriction of the firm according to equa-
tion (3) must be considered. The income tax on
dividends according to the shareholder relief
system is irrelevant to this decision because
the tax is due in any case, either immediately
in t = 0 or on reserves which are increased by
interest in t = 1. The only factor of importance
is how the interest incomes are taxed. If the in-
terest incomes are obtained privately (dividend
distribution in t = 0), the complete income tax
rate τp is applied to the interest. Otherwise, the
profit tax rate of the firm τc is applied.11
3. The contribution of a capital increase is posi-
tive if τc < τc* . Considering the budget restric-
tion of the owner according to equation (4),
external financing with equity by a temporary
increase in capital should be selected in order
to maximize the firm’s financial investment.
Above, we proved that τc* < τp if τp < 1. However,
it is possible that τc* < τc < τp where, at the date
t = 0, neither the payment of the dividend nor
a temporary increase in capital is advantageous.
Under these circumstances the optimal strategy
would be for the firm to invest C0 and the owner
to invest P0 in the capital market (‘‘free-of-transfer
financial investment’’). It is impossible to increase
the terminal value by maximizing the personal fi-
nancial investment with dividend payments or by
maximizing the financial investment of the firm
10 Regarding a particular case, Gratz (2002), p. 490 f., obtains
the same result.
11 See Elser (2001), p. 807 f.; Hundsdoerfer (2001), p. 116 f.
Similar results are obtained by Schreiber and Rogall (2000),
p. 724 f.
with a temporary increase in capital. That is re-
markable.
Now we will look at four scenarios that can be
described by a set of tax rates. For each of these
scenarios, an optimal policy is determined.
1. Scenario a: Low corporate tax rate (τc ≤ τc*)
Under these circumstances it is recommended
to minimize the personal financial investment
and to maximize the financial investment by
the firm. This means that E0 = P0, Div0 = 0
and D0 = 0. The terminal value comes to
Va1 = P0(1 + i(1 − τc)(1 − δτp))
+ C0(1 + i(1 − τc))(1 − δτp).
2. Scenario b: Medium corporate tax rate
(τc* < τc ≤ τp)
If this condition exists, neither should divi-
dends be distributed nor should capital tem-
porarily be increased so that Div0 = 0, E0 = 0
and D0 = 0. We receive
Vb1 = P0(1 + i(1 − τp))
+ C0(1 + i(1 − τc))(1 − δτp) .
3. Scenario c: High corporate tax rate
(τp < τc ≤ τp + τi)
In this scenario the optimal strategy is to trans-
fer all existing resources of the firm immedi-
ately to private property by choosing Div0 =
C0,E0 = 0 andD0 = 0. Then the terminal value
is
Vc1 = P0(1 + i(1 − τp))
+ C0(1 + i(1 − τp))(1 − δτp) .
4. Scenario d: Very high corporate tax rate
(τp + τi < τc)
In this case it is also optimal to transfer all ex-
isting resources to private property. In a world
where taxes do not matter, the terminal value
of the owner cannot be increased by credit fi-
nancing of the firm in t = 0 and at the same
time distributing the loan value as a dividend.
The interest paid by the firm would equate to
the interest income obtainable at the personal
level. When considering taxes, this irrelevance
disappears. Equation (9) shows that it is worth
having a credit-financed dividend if
Div0i(τc− τp)(1 − δτp) −D0iτi(1 − δτp) > 0
13
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holds. If a corresponding credit amount is dis-
tributed completely (D0 = Div0), this relation
is fulfilled if τp + τi < τc. In our model, unlim-
ited economic prosperity could be achieved by
a credit-financed immediate dividend. How-
ever, there are distribution restrictions12 which
should be built into the model. The dividends
must not exceed the distributable revenue re-
serves Divmax0 so that Div0 ≤ Div
max
0 . To sim-
plify, we assume in the following that the
firm’s resources C0 can be fully distributed
(Divmax0 ≥ C0). So, in scenario d Div
max
0 is dis-
tributed. If C0 does not suffice to finance this
dividend, the difference is financed by a loan.
How can this credit and interest be paid in
t = 1? Since we analyze the default alternative,
there are no returns on the investment project.
Nor does the firm receive returns on a finan-
cial investment in t = 1 because it distributes
every penny in t = 0. The credit would def-
initely default, resulting in no creditor being
found. However, as obtaining credit is advan-
tageous for the owner, he or she will be willing
to guarantee the debt with his or her personal
property. For tax purposes, this guarantee sys-
tematically has to be treated as deferred acqui-
sition costs of his investment.13 The part δ of
the deferred acquisition costs saves on income
tax.14 The planning horizon of our model ends
at t = 1, so tax savings must be considered at
this point in time.
Therefore, there is a redemption payment by
the owner on a debt of his firm, a corpora-
tion. The part δ of this payment reduces the
owner’s income tax burden. In our model this
payment can be interpreted as a negative div-
idend (Div1 ≤ 0). Although dividends cannot
become negative, a fictitious negative dividend
would have the same payment effects and tax
consequences as claiming a guarantee.
12 See, e.g., for Germany § 30 para 1 GmbHG (Act Concerning
Limited Liability Companies).
13 See, e.g., for Germany the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Fiscal
Court) ruling of 24.04.1997 VIII R 23/93, Bundessteuerblatt II
1999, 342; Bundesfinanzhof ruling of 06.07.1999 VIII R 9/98,
Bundessteuerblatt II 1999, 817.
14 This holds, e.g., for the German shareholder relief system,
providing § 17 or § 23 EStG (German Income Tax Act) applies.





a b c d
Range τc≤τc* τc*<τc≤τp τp<τc≤τp+τi τp+τi<τc
Div0 0 0 C0 Div
max
0
E0 P0 0 0 0
D0 0 0 0 Div
max
0 −C0
Table 1 shows the following budget restriction




As CF1 = 0, Mc0 = 0 and E0 = 0, the nega-
tive dividend (the owner claims the guarantee)
equals the amount of the loan plus interest




Div1 = −D0(1 + i) − T
c
1 .
Considering the credit-financed dividend in
t = 0, the terminal value for Div0 = Div
max
0 ,
E0 = 0 and D0 = Div
max
0 − C0 comes to
Vd1 = P0(1 + i(1 − τp))
+ C0(1 + i(1 − τc))(1 − δτp)
+Divmax0 i(τc − τp)(1 − δτp)
− (Divmax0 − C0)iτi(1 − δτp)
= P0(1 + i(1 − τp))
+ C0(1 + i(1 − τc + τi))(1 − δτp)
+Divmax0 i(τc − τp − τi)(1 − δτp) .
Table 2 summarizes the results of our con-
siderations regarding tax optimization of the
default alternative.
At the boundary between the scenarios a and b
(τc = τc* ), it makes no difference for the termi-
nal value how the temporary increase in capi-
tal E0 is chosen. The same is applied between
scenarios b and c regarding the dividend (for
0 < Div0 < C0) and for the boundary between
scenarios c and d regarding the credit-financed
dividend. Figure 1 illustrates the terminal val-
ues of the four strategies.15
15 The diagram is based on the following values: C0 = 100,
P0 = 100, i = 0.1, Div
max
0
= 150. The tax rates are modeled
according to the 2007 German tax system (δ = 0.5, aic1 = 0.5,
aic2 = 1, ac1c2 = 1) and with τp = 0.4 and τc1 = 0.1667.
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Figure 1: Terminal value of the default alternative depending
on the corporate tax rate on profits
Financial investment of all resources
on corporate level
Mixed financial investment (transfer free)
Financial investment of all resources
on personal level
Financial investment of all resources
on personal level and credit-financed dividend























4 Terminal value of executing the
investment project
4.1 Options of financing the investment
project
Now we focus on whether the investment project
should be carried out or not. In order to realize the
project, the firm must raise the amount I0 minus
the immediate tax refund amounting to τcβI0. The
following three sources of financing are available:
1. Internal financing with equity. This means re-
ducing the dividend in t = 0 (decrease inDiv0).
2. External financing with equity (equity financ-
ing). This corresponds to an increase in E0.
3. External financing with credit capital (credit
financing), which results in an increase in D0.
One could think of the reduction of a firm’s fi-
nancial investment (Mc
0
) as an additional financ-
ing instrument. However, a glance at the budget
restriction of the firm shows that Mc
0
is a pure
residuum if one assumes a given investment vol-
ume I0, given corporate cash resources C0 as well
as defined values for the three above-mentioned
financing instruments.
In fact, a fourth financing source is available if
tax is refunded in t = 0 (due to β > 0). However,
we assume that β is given exogenously and cannot
be chosen freely by the firm. Therefore, the in-
vestment of the tax authorities does not represent
a decision variable.
4.2 Optimal financing of the investment
project
Whether it is worth executing an investment project
must now be examined in detail. It is important to
consider that the project is financed tax-optimal.
Consequently, the tax-optimized project must be
compared with the tax-optimal default alternative
regarding the achievable terminal value.
In order to analyze what effects the use of the
financing instrument has on the terminal value of
the owner, we consider equation (9) and examine
how the terminal value changes if we reduce the
dividend, temporarily increase the capital and/or
increase the credit. The first derivatives of the












= −iτi(1 − δτp) .(13)
The derivatives VDiv, VE and VD express to what
extent the owner’s terminal value changes if one
required monetary unit for the investment project
is made available with the respective financing
instrument (reduction of dividend, temporary in-
crease in capital, credit capital increase).16 It is
important to be aware of the fact that the algebraic
sign of the change of the terminal value is not
clear in respect to the reduction of dividend and
temporary increase in capital. For instance, if the
profit tax rate of the firm τc is smaller than the tax
rates τp and τc* , the derivatives VDiv and VE will
become positive. Therefore, internal financing and
equity financing will cause the terminal value to
16 For β > 0 amortization also contributes to the financing of
the project. This contribution amounts to Vβ := dV1/dβ =
I0iτc(1 − δτp). However, in the following we assume that amor-
tization regulations are given. Therefore β is no decisive vari-
able.
15
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increase. By contrast, if τi > 0 the capital contribu-
tion caused by credit financing is always negative,
0 > VD.
We will now prove that internal financing from
dividend retention is always at least as good as
external equity financing (temporary increase in
capital) if τp ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1]. We allege that
VDiv > VE. Inserting and rearranging terms yields
the following:
−i(τc − τp)(1 − δτp) > −i(τc − τc* )(1 − δτp)
τp > τc* .
We have already proven that above.
Now we know that VDiv > VE and 0 > VD always
holds. Under these conditions, six rankings regard-
ing VDiv, VE, VD and 0 are possible. In analogy to
the default alternative, we can distinguish between
the following scenarios:
1. Scenario a: Low corporate tax rate (τc ≤ τc* )
In this case the following relation holds:
VDiv > VE ≥ 0 > VD .
We only need to show that VE ≥ 0. Equation
(12) reveals that this is given for the applied
assumptions.
2. Scenario b: Medium corporate tax rate
(τc* < τc ≤ τp)
From τc ≤ τp results VDiv ≥ 0 due to equation
(11). Moreover, regarding equation (12) it can
be stated that 0 > VE if τc* < τc. At the cur-
rent tax rate relation, we obtain the ranking
VDiv ≥ 0 > VE. It is hard to decide whether
external financing with equity is favorable to
external financing with credit capital or vice
versa. In order to assess this, we must distin-
guish between two subsets.
(a) Scenario b1: Debit interest surcharge rate
τi is high (τi > τc − τc* )
Equations (12) and (13) immediately show
that τi > τc − τc* implies the ranking VE >
VD, which yields the following results:
VDiv ≥ 0 > VE > VD.
(b) Scenario b2: Debit interest surcharge rate
τi is low (τi ≤ τc − τc* )
Now the reverse is the case. Thus VD ≥ VE
holds with the result
VDiv ≥ 0 > VD ≥ VE .
3. Scenario c: High corporate tax rate
(τp < τc ≤ τp + τi)
From τp < τc follows the relation 0 > VDiv
due to equation (11) so that the ranking 0 >
VDiv > VE is given in scenario c. The priority of
credit financing cannot be determined without
knowing the relation of further tax rates. Again,
two subsets must be examined.
(a) Scenario c1: Debit interest surcharge rate
τi is high (τi > τc − τc* ≥ τc − τp)
From τi > τc − τc* results VE > VD, which
yields the ranking
0 > VDiv > VE > VD .
Raising credit is the least optimal financing
alternative.
(b) Scenario c2: Debit interest surcharge rate
τi is low (τc − τc* ≥ τi > τc − τp)
If the debit interest surcharge rate is lower,
external financing with equity capital may
be less preferable than external financing
with credit capital. With the help of equa-
tions (11), (12) and (13), it becomes clear
that under the characterized conditions,
both VDiv > VD and VD ≥ VE hold. Alto-
gether, this yields the following ranking:
0 > VDiv > VD ≥ VE .
4. Scenario d: Very high corporate tax rate
(τp + τi < τc)
According to scenario c, the relation 0 > VDiv
results due to τp < τc from equation (11). Since
we already know that VDiv always exceeds VE,
the ranking 0 > VDiv > VE is obtained. In order
to analyze whether credit financing is preferred
to internal and equity financing, the derivatives
VDiv, VE and VD have to be compared. As the
debit interest surcharge rate τi in this scenario
turns out to be very low, with τc − τp > τi, we
have the ranking 0 > VD > VDiv. This becomes
clear by considering equations (11) and (13).
Therefore, we receive altogether
0 > VD > VDiv > VE .
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Figure 2: Illustration of alternative scenarios
Scenario a Scenario b1 Scenario b2 Scenario c2 Scenario d
Scenario a Scenario b1 Scenario c2 Scenario dScenario c1
τc* +τc* iτ τp iττp +
τc* +τc* iττp iττp +
τc
τc
Credit financing emerges as the best financing
instrument under these circumstances.
In contrast to the default alternative, it does not
suffice to verify whether the profit tax rate of the
firm is low (τc ≤ τc* ), medium (τc* < τc ≤ τp), high
(τc* ≤ τp < τc ≤ τp+τi) or very high (τp+τi < τc). The
implementation of a project with an adequately
large investment volume requires financing in-
struments whose uses should be waived in the de-
fault case. In addition, it must be verified whether
τc ≤ τc* + τi ≤ τp + τi or τc* + τi < τc ≤ τp + τi
holds. Illustration 2 shows that there are two mu-
tually exclusive possibilities: either τc* + τi < τp or
τp ≤ τc* + τi.
If τc* + τi < τp scenario b2 is relevant; otherwise
scenario c1 is relevant. The following equation




























As far as the default alternative is concerned, the
subsets b1 and b2 must not be distinguished in sce-
nario b because, as the project is not implemented,
there is no external financing, neither with equity
nor with credits. If the investment is carried out,
raising credit or temporarily increasing capital may
be necessary. Consequently, the ranking of these
financing instruments plays an important role. Ex-
ternal financing with equity is more favorable than
raising credit in scenario b1. In scenario b2 it is
vice versa.
4.3 Detailed instructions
For each scenario, the following instructions can
be formulated:
Scenario a: Corporate taxation is so low that
all investments (the investment project and the
financing investment) should be carried out by the
corporation. Dividends are not profitable (Div0 =
0). For the temporary increase in capital -- inde-
pendent of the investment volume -- the maximum
value (P0) should be chosen. Credit should only
be raised if the available funds on the corporate
level (including the amount of the capital increase)
C0 + P0 are insufficient for financing the invest-
ment. If I0(1 − βτc) > C0 + P0 the difference must
be financed by a credit,D0 = I0(1−βτc) − (C0 +P0).
Scenario b1: Dividends are not profitable due
to low corporate taxation, Div0 = 0. The capital
increase should only be chosen if the investment
volume exceeds the available funds at the corporate
level C0. If C0 + P0 > I0(1 − βτc) > C0 then E0 =
I0(1 − βτc) − C0 must be chosen. The temporary
capital increase is still much more preferable to
the external financing with credit capital, which is
only chosen if the capital increase is insufficient for
financing the investment project. If I0(1 − βτc) >
C0+P0 thenE0 = P0 andD0 = I0(1−βτc)−(C0+P0)
is set.
Scenario b2: Corporate taxation is still too low
for a dividend distribution to be profitable, Div0 =
0. The disadvantage of external credit financing is
now less than that of external equity financing. If
corporate funds C0 are insufficient for financing
the investment project completely, the shortfall
must be financed by a credit. If I0(1 − βτc) > C0
then D0 = I0(1 − βτc) − C0 must be chosen. The
temporary increase in capital is not profitable,
E0 = 0.
Scenario c1: In this scenario corporate taxa-
tion is high enough for a dividend distribution
to be advantageous compared to the default al-
ternative. However, a dividend retention is the
best financing method if the project is carried out.
If the project’s investment volume is lower than
the corporate financial resources, the project must
be financed from these funds and the remaining
amount has to be distributed. If I0(1 − βτc) ≤ C0
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Table 3: Optimal financing of the investment project: Scenarios, subsets and instructions
(continued on next page)
Scenario a b
b1 b2
Tax rates τc ≤ τc* τc* < τc ≤ τp
τi > τc − τc* τi ≤ τc − τc*






D0 only if necessary
Div0 = 0
E0 only if necessary
D0 only if necessary
Div0 = 0




≤ C0 + P0 I*0 > C0 + P0 I
*
0
≤ C0 C0 < I*0 ≤ C0 + P0 I
*
0




Detailed Div0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
instructions E0 P0 P0 0 I*0 − C0 P0 0 0
D0 0 I*0 − (C0 + P0) 0 0 I
*
0
− (C0 + P0) 0 I*0 − C0
Constellation 1 2 3 4 5 = 3* 6
*: These are no separate constellations, because they coincide with constellations 3 and 7 with respect to the
instructions in case of the realization of the project as well as in case of the default alternative.
I*0 stands for I0(1 − βτc).
then Div0 = C0 − I0(1 − βτc) is to be chosen. Only
if corporate capital C0 is insufficient for financ-
ing the investment project must the shortfall be
financed through a temporary increase in capital.
If I0(1−βτc) > C0 then E0 = I0(1−βτc) −C0 should
be chosen. Only if these funds are insufficient for
financing the investment (despite the increase in
capital), must the difference be financed by a credit.
Consequently if I0(1 − βτc) > C0 + P0 the optimal
credit amounts to D0 = I0(1 − βτc) − (C0 + P0).
Scenario c2: According to c1, corporate taxa-
tion is so high that a dividend distribution with
the following personal financial investment would
be advantageous compared to the default alterna-
tive. Reducing the dividend is the best financing
source if the project is to be realized. If the in-
vestment project can be financed completely us-
ing corporate funds, then the remaining amount
is to be distributed. If I0(1 − βτc) ≤ C0 then
Div0 = C0 − I0(1 − βτc) must be chosen. Only if
corporate cash resources C0 are insufficient for fi-
nancing the project must the shortfall be financed
through a credit. If I0(1 − βτc) > C0 then choosing
D0 = I0(1−βτc) −C0 is optimal. External financing
with equity is not profitable, therefore E0 = 0.
Scenario d: Corporate taxation is even higher
than in scenarios c1 and c2. Consequently, a max-
imum dividend distribution Div0 = Div
max
0 with
a following privately funded deposit is worth it,
independently of whether the investment project
is carried out. The project as well as the dividend
must be financed by corporate cash resources C0
and creditD0. This results inC0+D0 = I0(1−βτc)+
Divmax0 . Consequently,D0 = I0(1−βτc)+Div
max
0 −C0
is set. Again, external financing with equity is not
profitable, therefore E0 = 0.
Table 3 provides an overview of the six scenarios
as well as the instructions.
4.4 Terminal value differences for all
possible constellations
Table 3 shows that there are 11 different constella-
tions. Each of these combinations contains
• an optimal financing program for the scenario,
• the particular investment volume for the real-
ization, and
• a complete program for the default alternative.
The specific terminal value formulas for each of
these 11 combinations are derived according to
a uniform pattern.
We describe the general procedure using constel-
lation 6 in Table 3 as an example. This corresponds
to scenario b2 subject to condition I0(1−βτc) > C0.
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Table 3: (continued)
c d
c1 (alternative of b2) c2
τp < τc ≤ τp + τi τp + τi < τc
τi > τc − τc* ≥ τc − τp τc − τc* ≥ τi > τc − τp
0 > VDiv > VE > VD 0 > VDiv > VD ≥ VE 0 > VD > VDiv > VE
reduction of dividends only if necessary
E0 only if necessary
D0 only if necessary
reduction of dividends only
if necessary
D0 only if necessary
E0 = 0









≤ C0 C0 < I*0 ≤ C0 + P0 I
*
0











− C0 P0 0 0 0
0 0 I*
0






7 8 9 = 7* 10 11
1. First, the terminal value is calculated if the
project is realized according to equation (9),
which is repeated as follows.
V 1 = (−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1)
× (1 − τc)(1 − δτp)
+ P0(1 + i(1 − τp))
+ C0(1 + i(1 − τc))(1 − δτp)
+Div0i(τc − τp)(1 − δτp)
− E0i(τc − τc* )(1 − δτp)
−D0iτi(1 − δτp) .
The determinations of the financing instru-
ments characterized in constellation 6 are:
Div0 = 0 ,
E0 = 0 and
D0 = I0(1 − βτc) − C0 .
With these specifications, the aforementioned
terminal value equation reduces to
V
(6)
1 = (−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1)(15)
× (1 − τc)(1 − δτp)
+ P0(1 + i(1 − τp))
+ C0(1 + i(1 − τc))(1 − δτp)
− (I0(1 − βτc) − C0)
× iτi(1 − δτp) .
2. The default alternative yields a terminal value
in scenario b as follows:
Vb1 = P0(1 + i(1 − τp))(16)
+ C0(1 + i(1 − τc))(1 − δτp) .
3. The terminal value difference for combination








for which the following formula is obtained






(−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1)
× (1 − τc) − (I0(1 − βτc) − C0)iτi
)
× (1 − δτp) .
Table 4 supplies a complete overview of the de-
termined terminal value differences. If we take
a closer look at these differences, some of the re-
sults are quite remarkable.
1. There are four constellations where neither
corporate nor personal cash resources have to
be known. Both C0 and P0 are irrelevant to
the calculation of the terminal value differ-
ence. This is the case for constellations 1, 3,
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Table 4: Complete overview of all terminal value differences





−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1
)












−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1
)












(−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1)(1 − τc) − I0(1 − βτc)iτi





















(−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1)(1 − τc) − I0(1 − βτc)i(τc − τc* )







(−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1)(1 − τc) − I0(1 − βτc)iτi







(−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1)(1 − τc) − I0(1 − βτc)iτi







(−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1)(1 − τc) − I0(1 − βτc)iτi
)
(1 − δτp)
7 and 11. Moreover, it is remarkable that the
terminal value differences of constellations 1
and 3 are completely identical, although their
default alternatives do not correspond in both
constellations.
2. Only in three constellations (2, 5 and 9) is in-
formation about personal cash resources nec-
essary.
3. For β = 0 (amortization only in t = 1), in
each of these equations the ‘‘project’s contri-
bution to the terminal value in a world without
taxes’’17 is completely subject to corporate tax
(τc) and delta-income tax (δτp). Indeed, these
taxes determine the amount of the terminal
value contribution, but not its algebraic sign.
The determination of the taxable profit is not
influenced by the choice of β and is therefore
decision-neutral. In general, the delta-income
tax has only two decisive effects:
• In constellations 4 and 5, τc* affects the
terminal value difference through the type
of financing. τc* itself is determined by
the delta-income tax, because τc* = (1 −
δ)τp/(1 − δτp).
17 That is −I0(1 + i) + CF1.
• With the help of τc* , the delta-income tax
has an influence on what scenario and
which constellation will occur.
ΔV (1)
1
shall be considered an example. The in-
come tax rate as well as the shareholder relief
system, which implies a prorated inclusion of
dividends in the tax base, influence the abso-
lute amount of the terminal value difference.
However, at β = 0 a positive terminal value
difference before income tax remains positive
for τp ∈ (0, 1); the same is true for cases of
negative terminal value differences.
4. For β > 0 (amortization in t = 0), the recogni-
tion of profits turns out to be a tax concession:
An investment project with a negative terminal
value-difference before tax can obtain a posi-
tive terminal value-difference after taxes. The
size of the effect depends on the interest rate
because the advantage of the immediate amor-
tization is a pure interest advantage in our
model.18
4.5 A remark on net present values
The terminal value-differences from Table 4 could
also be reinterpreted as net present values. Con-
18 Concerning the taxation paradox, see, e.g., Schneider (1969).
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sidering the terminal value-difference for constel-
lation 1 as an example, it can only be positive if and
only if
−I0(1 + i(1 − βτc)) + CF1 > 0 .
This inequation can be transferred either to
−I0 +
CF1







Readers may attempt to interpret the left side as net
present value. The investment is profitable if the
discounted sum of the gross cash flow plus the tax
advantages caused by the amortization exceed the
investment payment. However, caution is required
with such intuitive interpretations.
It is beyond dispute in the literature that the net
present value of an investment project under the
conditions of a so-called complete capital market
can be interpreted as the amount available for
withdrawal in t = 0, which can be expended with-
out being positioned worse at the realization of the
project than at the choice of the default alterna-
tive. If the capital market is not complete, such
a critical immediate withdrawal can be calculated
as well. However, it is known that an investor who
maximizes the terminal value does not make the
same decisions as investors who want to maxi-
mize the withdrawal in t = 0. In our model we
assume identical gross-interest rates for creditors
and debtors. However, we cannot assume that the
after-tax interest rates correspond.
In fact, the above mentioned inequations are advis-
able for persons maximizing their terminal values
under the condition of constellation 1 but it is inap-
propriate to interpret the left sides as net present
values.
5 Numerical examples
5.1 Application to the German tax system
We now want to show how the model can be
applied to an existing tax system. For convenience
reasons, we choose the German 2007 tax system.
In Germany, the firm pays local business tax and
corporate income tax. German local business tax
allows only a partial deduction of interest paid for
permanent debt. We assume loans taken out by the
firm are to be characterized as permanent debts.
Regarding the current tax reform as well as possible
future tax reforms in Germany, we distinguish
between
• aic1 ∈ [0, 1] as the deductible part of the inter-
est on permanent debt for local business tax
purposes,
• aic2 ∈ [0, 1] as the deductible part of the inter-
est on permanent debt for corporate income
tax purposes and
• ac1c2 ∈ [0, 1] as the deductible part of the local
business tax costs for corporate income tax
purposes.
So the profit tax of the firm in t = 1 is
Tc1 = τc1(CF1 − (1 − β)I0 + iM
c






CF1 − (1 − β)I0 + iM
c
0 − aic2 iD0
−ac1c2τc1
(









where τc1 stands for the local business tax rate and
τc2 stands for the corporate income tax rate (in-
cluding solidarity surcharge). From this we derive
the tax multifactors
τc = τc1 + (1 − ac1c2τc1)τc2 and
τi = τc1(1 − aic1)(1 − ac1c2τc2) + τc2(1 − aic2).
So the tax equation of the firm for t = 1 is:




Now we can elicit which of the scenarios b2 and
c1 may be ruled out. For this purpose, we apply
inequation (14). Even if a very high municipal
rate of 500% is assumed for calculating the local
business tax rate, the income tax rate (including
solidarity surcharge rate) has to be below 16.5% or
above 91.0% according to the current German tax
system19 if these inequations are to be fulfilled. At
the moment, such low or high margin-income tax
19 δ = aic1 = 0.5 as well as aic2 = ac1c2 = 1 and τc2 = 0.25.
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rates (beyond the poverty level) are not realistic.
Therefore, scenario b2 is relevant in the current
German taxation system.
In order to show the apparent tax effects in our
model, we analyze two numerical examples with
the following characteristics. The cash resources
of the corporation amount to C0 = 41. There are
personal financial resources amounting to P0 =
20. The interest rate is i = 10%. An income tax
rate of τp = 0.44 and a local business tax rate of
τc1 = 0.167 (municipal rate of 400%) is assumed.
For the deduction of the interest on debts and the
local business tax at the profit taxes, the current
German tax system is assumed: aic1 = 0.50, aic2 =
1.00, ac1c2 = 1.00. The recognition of profits is
decision-neutral (β = 0). On this basis we consider
terminal value differences depending on the profit
tax rate τc (local business tax and corporate income
tax) for three project variants.
• In the first variant (continuous line), a low
investment volume (I0 < C0) is assumed, I0 =
40.
• In the second variant (interrupted line), C0 by
itself is insufficient for financing the invest-
ment project (C0 < I0 < C0 + P0), I0 = 60.
• In the third variant (dotted line), the invest-
ment volume is so high that it cannot be fi-
nanced without raising a credit (I0 > C0 + P0),
I0 = 100.
For each investment project, we assume a gross
return of 10.3% so that all three projects are ad-
vantageous before tax and their terminal value
contribution increases with the investment vol-
ume.
If taxes are included in the analysis, that statement
no longer holds. Figure 3 shows clearly that the
benefit of a project is dependent on the corporate
tax rate, despite decision-neutral amortizations.
Where the corporate tax rate is low (τc < 0.25),
the project with the medium investment volume
(interrupted line) achieves the highest terminal
value contribution. The terminal value contribu-
tion of the project with the highest investment
volume (dotted line) is always negative. The rea-
son for that is that fiscal discrimination of credit
interest payments cannot be avoided with a high
investment volume. From a corporate tax rate of
approximately 43% and above, the terminal value
Figure 3: Terminal value differences depending on corporate
tax rates on profits (example 1)






contributions of all three investment projects are
negative.
We observe that the terminal value differences
do not behave monotonously in relation to the
profit tax rate of the firm. In fact, the functions
show local maxima and minima. An explanation is
necessary. For this purpose, we consider the same
example as before, however this time ensuring that
for each investment volume, an identical terminal
value difference before taxes is given. In order to
explain the apparently random increase and de-
crease of the functions, we focus on the project
with the medium investment volume (interrupted
line). The following can be stated for this project:
Figure 4: Terminal value differences depending on corporate
tax rates on profits (example 2)
τc
V V1 1
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At a firm’s income tax rate of up to τc = 0.265, con-
stellation 1 is relevant. The project with a volume
of 60 and a financial investment in the amount of 1
are financed by corporate cash resources C0 = 41
and by a temporary increase in capital amount-
ing to E0 = 20. If the corporate tax rates ranges
between 0.265 and 0.33, constellation 4 is ap-
plied. For corporate tax rates between 0.33 and
0.415, constellation 6 is applied. If the corporate
tax rate is between 0.415 and 0.47, constellation 10
is relevant. If the corporate tax rate exceeds 0.47,
constellation 11 is applied.
5.2 Country comparison
In the Table 5, we show for selected countries
which scenario is relevant. The corporate tax rate
τc is the marginal rate for high profits. The debit
interest surcharge rate τi is the marginal rate for
paid interest on debt. The personal income tax
rate τp is the maximum marginal rate on interest
income. Options for the taxpayers not to choose
the shareholder relief system and other exceptions
were neglected.
Table 5: Scenarios for selected countries
Country τc τi τp1 δ Scenario
Austria 2007 0.25 0.00 0.25 1 b2
Germany 20072 0.39 0.06 0.47 0.5 b2
Germany 20092 0.30 0.04 0.26 1 c2
Ireland 2007 0.13 0.00 0.41 1 b2
Slovakia 2007 0.19 0.00 0.19 0 a
1 maximum rate; 2 municipal rate 400%
6 Conclusion
We have presented the evaluation of an indivisi-
ble investment carried out in a corporation. One
should think that this problem is not too diffi-
cult because certainty, the domestic case, only one
owner subject to income tax and proportional tax
rates are presumed. Moreover, the problems of
accrual taxation are only considered in a very sim-
plified way with respect to only two payment date
points.
It is surprising that the evaluation under these
simple premises is such a complex challenge. The
reason for this is mainly the separate taxation
of the corporation and owner (separation princi-
ple). The financing of the investment project with
external equity capital, external credit capital or
through a dividend retention as well as the defini-
tion of the default alternative require diverse case
differentiations.
Under the German tax system for 2007 (τc2 = 0.25,
moiety adding of interest on permanent debt for lo-
cal business tax purposes) and for positive income
tax rates, the relevant scenario is characterized as
follows: Internal financing from dividend reten-
tion is -- whether the project is realized or not --
advantageous. Any capital shortfall should be fi-
nanced by credits. Temporary increases in capital
should be waived.
Some general tendencies are recognizable, inde-
pendently of what tax regime applies. Raising
credit capital is unprofitable since for local busi-
ness tax purposes, only a part of the interest on
permanent debt is deductible. In case of the default
alternative, external credit financing of an addi-
tional financial investment is not feasible. How-
ever, external credit financing can be preferable
to equity financing when corporate tax rates are
relatively high. If internal financing capacities are
exhausted in an investment, it depends on the in-
dividual case whether equity financing or credit
financing are more suitable. In the extreme cases
of very high corporate tax rates, external credit
financing is even better than financing from divi-
dend retention.
For the choice between external equity financing
and internal financing (as well as deciding whether
a financial investment should occur on the corpo-
rate or owner level at the default alternative), the
following applies: The temporary increase in cap-
ital is never preferable to financing by dividend
retention. The higher the corporate tax rate rela-
tive to the income tax rate, the less preferable is
equity financing, and the more profitable is a fi-
nancial investment at the owner level in case of the
default alternative. In this case, however, calculat-
ing the terminal value differences is exceptionally
laborious.
We have not considered possible exogenous re-
strictions such as dividend obligations which are
imposed on the corporation by shareholders. Such
restrictions are caused by information asymme-
tries and interest conflicts in the principal-agent
relation between management and shareholders.
Our model is neither suitable nor intended to il-
lustrate such principal-agent problems.
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